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Abstract
This paper examines the impact of the licensing policies of one or more upstream
owners of essential intellectual property (IP hereafter) on the downstream firms that
require access to that IP, as well as on consumers and social welfare. The paper
considers a model in which there is product differentiation downstream. License fees
and fixed entry costs determine the number of downstream competitors and thus
variety.
We first consider the case where there is a single upstream owner of essential
IP. Increasing the number of licenses enhances product variety, which creates added
value, but it also intensifies downstream competition, which dissipates profits. We
derive conditions under which the upstream IP monopoly will then want to provide
an excessive or insufficient number of licenses, relative to the number that maximizes
consumer surplus or social welfare.
When there are multiple owners of essential IP, royalty stacking can reduce the
number of the downstream licensees, but also the downstream equilibrium prices the
consumers face. The paper derives conditions determining whether this reduction in
downstream price and variety is beneficial to consumers or society.
Finally, the paper explores the impact of alternative licensing policies. With
fixed license fees or royalties expressed as a percentage of the price, an upstream IP
owner cannot control the intensity of downstream competition. In contrast, volume-
based license fees (i.e., per-unit access fees), do permit an upstream owner to control
downstream competition and to replicate the outcome of complete integration. The
paper also shows that vertical integration can have little impact on downstream
competition and licensing terms when IP owners charge fixed or volume-based access
fees.
1 Introduction
Patent thickets, layers of licenses a firm needs to be able to offer products that embody
technologies owned by multiple firms, and licensing policies have drawn increasing
scrutiny from policy makers. Patent thickets involve complementary products, which
gives rise to double marginalization – the so-called royalty stacking problem – and has
the potential to retard diffusion of new technologies and reduce consumer welfare.1
This paper examines the impact of licensing policies of one or more upstream owners
of essential intellectual property (IP hereafter) on the downstream firms that require
access to that IP. The terms under which downstream firms can access this IP affects
entry decisions, product diversity, prices and welfare. We consider both the case in
which a single party controls the essential IP and the case in which different parties
control complementary pieces of essential IP. We compare the outcome of several
alternative standard licensing arrangements, such as flat rate access fees, royalty
percentages, per unit fees, patent pools and cross-licensing arrangements, with or
without vertical integration.
We first consider the case where there is a single owner of essential IP. The IP
owner faces a trade-off between two conflicting forces. Increasing the number of li-
censes enhances product variety, which allows downstream firms to better meet con-
sumer demand, thus creating added value. However, it also intensifies downstream
competition, which dissipates profits. We adopt a framework that reflects this trade-
off, in which the IP owner can have an incentive to sell a larger or a smaller number
of licenses than is socially desirable.
Specifically, we suppose that downstream firms compete in price and other non-
price attributes. The non-price attributes are firm locations on a circular market, as
in Salop (1979). Consumers are uniformly distributed on the circle and transportation
costs are proportional to the distance between the firm and the consumer. Consumers
buy from the firm offering the lowest delivered price, as long as this price does not
exceed the consumer’s reservation price. The number of downstream competitors is
endogenous: entrants must each incur a fixed cost, and the license fees together with
1See for example SCM v Xerox: Paper Blizzard for $1.8 Billion,” New York
Times, June 27, 1977. As technology has become increasingly complex, this con-
cern has drawn both judicial and legislative scrutiny – see Business Week Online
http://www.businessweek.com/magazine/content/07 20/b4034049.htm May 14, 2007, From Busi-
ness Week, May 23, 2007
http://www.businessweek.com/smallbiz/content/may2007/sb20070523 462426.htm,
http://www.house.gov/apps/list/press/ca28 berman/berman patent bill.pdf and http://www.ip-
watch.org/weblog/index.php?p=427.
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this fixed cost contribute to determine the number of competitors.
As pointed out by Spence (1975), a key factor determining the number of licenses
downstream is the effect of the number of licenses on the downstream market price,
rather than on the incremental surplus derived by all downstream consumers. This
market price, in turn, depends on the value of the marginal consumer served by each
downstream firm. A higher density of firms means lower transportation costs on
average, and even more so for the marginal consumer. Since marginal consumers thus
benefit most from increased variety, an integrated monopolist would typically wish
to have too many downstream outlets. An unintegrated IP owner will however fear
profit dissipation through downstream competition, and may thus wish to have too
many or too few downstream firms competing against each other.
We assume that the upstream firm sets the terms under which downstream firms
can obtain access to its essential IP; we consider alternative common licensing ar-
rangements: fixed access fees, per-unit access fees and royalty percentages.
We contrast the effect of volume based access fees with unit fees and flat rate access
charges. We find that for essential IP, a single upstream IP owner can better control
the intensity of downstream competition with per unit fees than with either royalty
percentages or fixed access fees. As a result, volume-based access fees encourage
the IP owner to issue more (and possibly too many) licenses; in our framework, per
unit fees actually allow the IP owner to replicate the fully integrated outcome, while
flat rate access fees and percentage royalties yield the same outcome and may result
in reduced variety, higher consumer prices and lower profits. Vertical integration
appears to have less of an impact on the IP owner’s ability to control competition; in
particular, it has no impact on the equilibrium prices, profits and variety in the case
of flat rate and per unit access fees.
The paper also studies regulatory intervention that ignores or supersedes patent
protection. In the model, oversight of the downstream market structure, intended to
increase social welfare under abuse of dominance doctrine, is equivalent to regulating
the licensing fees when there is no uncertainty about demand and costs. When there
is uncertainty about demand or costs, we characterize conditions that determine
whether regulation of price or market structure results in greater welfare.
We extend the basic model to the case in which there are two independent owners
of complementary and essential IP. We find that the ”patent thicket” can reduce
variety downstream relative to the case of monopoly. More precisely, by relying on
per unit license fees, the IP owners can still replicate the fully integrated outcome;
however, when they rely instead on flat access fees or percentage royalties, double
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marginalization leads to higher access charges and fewer downstream firms than does
monopoly or joint licensing. This reduction in variety is accompanied by a reduction
in consumer prices, and the net effect benefits consumers and may or may not increase
social welfare when an IP monopolist (or a patent pool) would sell too many licenses.
Vertical integration does not appear to have more impact than in the case of a single
owner of IP, while patent pools and cross-licensing agreements allow the IP owners
to replicate the same outcome as an upstream monopoly controlling all the IP.
The literature on IP licensing initially focused on the case of a single owner of
(inessential) innovation that allows a reduction in cost in a downstream market.
Arrow (1962) studied the impact of competition in that downstream market on the
incentives to innovate, while most of the other pioneering work focused on specific
modes of licensing such as the auctioning of a given number of licenses, flat rate
licensing or per unit fees. Katz and Shapiro (1985,1986) focus for example on the use
of flat rate licensing and study the incentive to share or auction an innovation, while
Kamien and Tauman (1986) show that flat rate licensing is indeed more profitable
(for non-drastic, and thus inessential IP) than volume-based royalties in the case of
a homogenous Cournot oligopoly.2 This is partly because the licensing agreement
offered to one firm affects its rivals’ profits if they do not buy a license, and thus
their bargaining position vis-a`-vis the IP owner; such strategic effects do not arise in
the case of essential (or, in their context, of drastic) innovation, since firms get no
profit if they do not buy a license - whatever the agreements offered to their rivals.
This optimality of flat rate licensing is somewhat at odds with what is observed
in practice, which triggered many authors to identify reasons justifying the use of
royalties. Muto (1993) shows for example that per unit fees can be more profitable
in the case of Bertrand oligopoly with differentiated products;3 Wang (1998) obtains
a similar result in the original context of a Cournot oligopoly when the IP owner is
one of the downstream firms, while Kishimoto and Muto (2008) extend this insight
to Nash Bargaining between an upstream IP owner and downstream firms; and Sen
(2005) shows that lumpiness, too, can provide a basis for the optimality of volume-
based royalties.4
2See Kamien (1992) for an overview of this early literature.
3Hernandez-Murillo and Llobet (2006) consider monopolistic competition with differentiated
products and introduce private information on the value of the innovation for the downstream
firms.
4Faulli-Oller and Sandonis (2002) and Erutku and Richelle (2006) look at two part licensing
policy when there is a differentiated product downstream duopoly and the upstream IP owner is
vertically integrated with one of the downstream firms.
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In practice, new technologies involve multiple components of complementary IP;
this has triggered an abundant literature, which has identified two offsetting factors in
ascertaining the effect on the number of licensors. One is the patent thicket problem,
which is an extension of Cournot’s 1838 complementary product oligopoly model to
IP.5 When there are two or more owners of essential IP, each fails to take into account
the impact of its licensing policy on the owners of complementary IP; this results in
double-marginalization (possibly in addition to the double-marginalization that oc-
curs when an upstream monopoly sells an input to downstream firms with market
power), which restricts the number of licensees relative to a welfare optimum, or
even to the number of licensees that would be allocated by an integrated monopolist.
However, when IP users are not final consumers but rather, (differentiated) interme-
diaries that compete in a downstream market, ”business stealing” effects may also
generate excessive entry: as some of the customers buying from a new entrant are
switching away from rivals, the revenue they generate may exceed the social value
created by entry.6 Excessive entry can result in inefficient duplication of fixed costs,
in which case royalty stacking can have beneficial effects: welfare can increase, and
the downstream market price decrease, when the number of downstream competitors
decreases from the level that would arise when there is a single, integrated owner of
IP.7 In contrast, Scotchmer (1991), Green and Scotchmer (1995), and Scotchmer and
Menell (2005) indicate that when investment is sequential, early investors may not be
able to capture the benefits accruing to subsequent investors. Their analysis supports
stronger patent protection for complementary technologies.8 This paper identifies a
different factor that explains how licensing fees affect downstream competition and
variety, in determining the effects of complementary IP.
5See Shapiro (2001,2006), Lichtman (2006), and Lemley and Shapiro (2006). See also Geradin,
Layne-Farrar and Padilla (2006) for further discussion.
6See Spence (1976), Dixit and Stiglitz (1977), Salop (1979), and Mankiw and Whinston (1986) for
detailed analyses of this issue. Tirole (1988, chapter 7) provides a good overview of this literature.
7See Rey and Tirole (2007) for a related discussion of potential defences for exclusionary conduct
and Vickers (1995) for an analysis of the cost and benefits of vertical integration and foreclosure in
the context of a partially regulated upstream monopolist.
8Studies of the effects of patent thickets include Heller and Eisenberg (1998), Kiley (1992) and
Kitch (2993) in bio-medical research, and Gerarin, Layne-Farrar, and Padilla (2006), Schanker-
man and Noel (2006), Walsh, Arora and Cohen (2003) and Ziedonis (2003) in technology intensive
industries.
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2 General framework
Upstream firms own a technology, protected by an IP right, which is a key input
to be active in a downstream market. Initially, a single IP owner does not use the
technology itself but licences it to downstream competitors (we discuss the impact of
vertical integration and of multiple complementary IP firms and rights later on).
Entry in the downstream market can affect consumers in two ways: directly,
through enhanced product variety, and indirectly, through increased competitive pres-
sure on prices. Suppose first that downstream competitors produce the same product
at the same cost. Entry has then no intrinsic value and, if there is any set-up cost, it
would clearly be socially as well as privately optimal to have the market served by a
single downstream firm.9 Yet a regulator might wish to stimulate entry in order to
encourage downstream competition. Suppose for example that the IP owner charges a
fixed access fee and the downstream firms compete imperfectly in a Cournot fashion.
The IP owner would then maximize and appropriate all the industry profit by charg-
ing a fee equal to the downstream monopoly profit, whereas a regulator might want
to impose a cap on the access fee, in order to reduce consumer prices and allocative
inefficiency, even if this inefficiently duplicates entry costs.10
When instead variety is valuable, increasing the number of firms can have an
ambiguous impact on consumer surplus: enhancing product variety tends to benefit
consumers, but it may also lead to higher prices, since firms’ offerings then better
respond to consumer needs. As a result, the IP holder may want to issue either too
many or too few licenses.
To see this, suppose that there is an infinite number of potential entrants in the
downstream market. However, to enter the market a downstream firm must have
access to the technology and pay a license fee φ to the IP holder. The timing is as
follows:
9Suppose for example that the downstream firms have the same cost function C (q) = f + cq,
and let U (q) denote consumers’ gross surplus, and P (q) = U ′ (q) the associated inverse demand
function. The social optimum maximizes U (q) + (P (q)− c) q − nf , possibly subject to a budget
constraint (P (q)− c) q ≥ nf , whereas the private optimum maximizes (P (q)− c) q−nf . The social
and private interests then lead to different pricing rules (marginal or average cost versus monopoly
price) but agree on the optimal number of firms, n = 1.
10Consider the example described in the previous footnote and let qC (n) denote the aggregate
quantity produced when n downstream firms compete a` la Cournot. A regulator would seek to
maximize
U
(
qC (n)
)− cqC (n)− nf
and would thus choose n > 1 whenever (ignoring integer problems) P
(
qC (1)
)
> c+ f/
(
qC
)′ (1).
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• First, the IP owner sets the license fee, φ.
• Second, potential entrants decide whether to buy a license or not.
• Third, downstream competition takes place among the licensees.
We will further assume that downstream competition leads to a symmetric equi-
librium. It is natural to posit that the per-firm profit, pi∗ (n), decreases as the number
of licensees, n, increases. Given the licensing fee φ set in the first stage, in the second
stage firms want to enter as long as pi∗ (n) > φ, and prefer to stay out if pi∗ (n) < φ.
The number of downstream competitors, n = n∗ (φ), is thus characterized by the free
entry condition
pi∗ (n) = φ.
Therefore, in the first stage, the IP owner can ”choose” the number of firms n by
setting the licensing to φ∗ (n) = pi∗ (n), and moreover, this fee allows the IP owner to
extract all downstream profits. The IP owner will thus seek to maximize aggregate
profit
nφ∗ (n) = Π∗ (n) ≡ npi∗ (n) .
We will denote by nΠ the optimal number of firms for the IP owner and suppose that
the market is viable: Π∗
(
nΠ
)
> 0.
In contrast, let nS and nW respectively denote the number of firms that maximizes
(subject to a budget constraint Π∗ (n) ≥ 0) consumer surplus, S∗ (n), and total
welfare,
W ∗ (n) ≡ S∗ (n) + Π∗ (n) .
By construction:
S∗
(
nS
) ≥ S∗ (nΠ) .
Similarly, a revealed preference argument yields:
Π∗
(
nΠ
) ≥ Π∗ (nW ) ,
S∗
(
nW
)
+ Π∗
(
nW
) ≥ S∗ (nΠ)+ Π∗ (nΠ) ,
and thus (summing-up these two inequalities):
S∗
(
nW
) ≥ S∗ (nΠ) .
Therefore, when entry in the downstream market overall benefits consumers (i.e.,
S∗ (.) increases with n), the IP owner will tend to restrict entry, compared to what
would be desirable for consumers or society: nΠ ≤ nW , nS. This is the case in
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the situation discussed above, where consumers do not care about variety; when
consumers enjoy variety, this remains the case as long as increasing the number of
downstream firms still yields lower prices or generates only moderate price increases,
despite the positive impact of variety on demand. A regulator would then wish to
foster entry, e.g., by imposing a cap on the licensing fee. In contrast, when additional
entry generates price increases that dominate the direct impact on demand (i.e., S∗ (.)
decreases as n increases), then the IP owner will tend to issue too many licenses, by
setting the licensing fee too low.
The overall impact of downstream competition on consumer surplus also drives
the analysis of royalty stacking when there are complementary IP technologies. Sup-
pose for example that there are not one but two upstream firms, each owning an
essential technology: that is, combined together, the two technologies allow firms to
be active in the downstream market, but each of them is necessary to be active in
that market. If the two IP holders were to join forces for the licensing of their rights,
they would as above choose to charge a total fee equal to φΠ ≡ pi∗ (nΠ) and share
the corresponding profit. If instead they independently set their own license fees φ1
and φ2, each downstream firm will earn
pi∗ (n)− (φ1 + φ2) ,
and the number of entrants will thus be equal to
n = n∗ (φ1 + φ2) .
Each IP holder i will therefore maximize
φin
∗ (φ1 + φ2) ,
which leads to a standard double-marginalization problem. When the IP owners
would already issue too few licences under joint licensing, double marginalization
makes things worse by further restricting the number of licensees. However, when
joint licensing would instead lead the IP holders to issue too many licenses, double
marginalization may come as a blessing since it counterbalances the bias towards
excessive entry – provided there is no ”overshooting”: double marginalization may
also lead to a number of licensees that is lower than socially desirable, to an extent
such that social welfare is reduced.
This discussion can be summarized as follows.
Proposition 1 Suppose that downstream competition generates a symmetric equilib-
rium in which per-firm profit pi∗ (n) decreases with n; then:
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• When S∗ (n) always increases with n, the owner of a single essential technology
would issue too few licences, compared with what would be optimal for society
or consumers; when there are multiple essential technologies, double marginal-
ization leads to access prices which are even more excessive and entry which is
even less sufficient in the downstream market;
• When instead S∗ (n) decreases as n increases, the owner of a single essential
technology would instead issue too many licences; in the case of multiple essen-
tial technologies, double marginalization tends to counterbalance this bias and
may thus lead to a more desirable outcome.
We now explore in more detail these issues in the context of a standard model of
downstream competition with horizontal product differentiation.
3 Downstream competition with product differen-
tiation
3.1 The model
We adopt the model proposed by Salop (1979), which adapted the Hotelling model of
horizontal differentiation to allow for any number of downstream competitors. There
is a continuum of consumers of total mass 1, uniformly distributed along a circle of
length one. A consumer buying from a firm ”located” at a distance d gets a utility r
but incurs a ”transportation cost” td, reflecting the disutility from not having a unit
corresponding to that consumer’s ideal characteristics.
As before, there is an infinite number of potential entrants in the downstream
market, and any firm with access to the technology can enter the market by incurring
a fixed cost f ; for expositional simplicity, we will suppose that downstream firms can
then produce at no cost (introducing a constant marginal cost would not affect the
analysis, rescaling the reservation and the equilibrium prices by the same amount).
For the sake of exposition, we will also ignore integer problems and treat the number
of entrants as a continuous variable.
This simple and well-known model, which relies on a standard discrete choice
approach, moreover allows us to focus on variety (i.e., entry) since, as long as the
market is served, prices do not affect total welfare directly (the terms of the licensing
agreements may and will however have an indirect impact, through their effect on
entry). It is also flexible enough to reflect the benefits of entry for consumers (directly
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through increased variety, but also possibly indirectly through more intense compe-
tition), as well as potential adverse effects (through increased local market power, as
discussed below). As a result, increasing the number of competitors may have either
a positive or a negative impact on consumers.
Before studying the impact of access terms on downstream competition, it is useful
to characterize first the optimal degree of variety, both from the private standpoint
of a fully integrated company, who would own and control the IP as well as the
downstream firms, and from the social (i.e., total welfare) standpoint.
3.2 Fully integrated monopoly
If a fully integrated monopolist could determine both the number of downstream
firms and their prices, it would choose to serve the entire market (or none) and to
distribute the downstream outlets uniformly along the circle in order to minimize
transportation costs and thus maximize demand. Therefore, for a given number of
firms n, an integrated monopolist would opt for a price such that p+ t/2n = r, that
is, a price equal to
pˆ (n) ≡ r − t
2n
.
Total industry profit would thus be equal to
Πˆ (n) ≡ r − t
2n
− nf,
which, ignoring divisibility problems, is maximal for
n = nM ≡
√
t
2f
.
The corresponding price and profit are respectively equal to
pM ≡ pˆ (nM) = r −√tf
2
,ΠM ≡ Πˆ (nM) = r −√2tf .
In what follows, we will assume that the industry is viable:
Assumption 1. Consumers’ reservation price is large enough, compared with
production and transportation costs, to make the industry viable: ΠM > 0, or
r2
tf
> 2.
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3.3 Welfare optimum
For any given number of firms n, as long as all consumers are served total welfare is
equal to the consumers’ value for the good, r, net of entry costs as well as of trans-
portation costs. Total transportation costs are again minimized when downstream
outlets are uniformly distributed along the circle, in which case they are equal to:
T (n) ≡ 2n
1
2n∫
0
txdx =
t
4n
.
Total welfare is therefore equal to
W (n) ≡ r − t
4n
− nf,
which, ignoring again divisibility problems, is maximal for:11
nW ≡
√
t
4f
.
Assumption 1 implies
W
(
nW
)
= r −
√
tf > 0.
It moreover implies that it is indeed socially desirable to cover the entire market. To
see this, suppose that, by selling at (marginal) cost, n firms do not cover the entire
market. The marginal consumers would then be located at a distance xˆ from the
nearest firm such that txˆ = r; total welfare would thus be equal to:
n
2 xˆ∫
0
(r − tx) dx− f
 = n [2xˆ(r − t xˆ
2
)
− f
]
= n
(
r2
t
− f
)
,
where the last term between parenthesis is positive under Assumption 1. Therefore,
it would be optimal to increase the number of firms until the entire market is served.
Note that nM > nW . As already mentioned, when deciding whether to add a
downstream outlet, an integrated monopolist – who fully internalizes the additional
entry cost f – focuses on its impact on marginal consumers (since they are the ones
that determine prices), which are the farthest away from the existing outlets and thus
benefit most from the introduction of additional outlets. In contrast, total welfare
takes into consideration the impact on all consumers, including inframarginal ones.
As a result, a fully integrated monopolist has an incentive to introduce excessively
many downstream subsidiaries.
11Imposing t > 4f (which is compatible with the other relevant conditions on r versus tf) would
ensure that all relevant numbers exceed 1.
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4 Licensing arrangements and downstream com-
petition
We now study in this framework the IP holder’s optimal licensing policy, given its
impact on the downstream market. We will again consider the following timing:
• First, the IP owner sets the terms for its licenses; these terms are non-discriminatory
and available to any firm wishing to enter the downstream market.12
• Second, potential entrants decide whether to buy a license or not; for the sake
of exposition, we will assume that firms entering the market locate themselves
uniformly along the circle; that minimizes total transportation costs and it thus
desirable for consumers as well as for the upstream firm.
• Third, downstream competition takes place among the licensees.
4.1 Fixed access fees
We first consider the case where the IP holder charges a fixed fee φ per license.
4.1.1 Downstream equilibrium
We now characterize the downstream competitive equilibrium price and profits. For
any given number, n, of firms which are uniformly distributed along the circle, there
exists a symmetric equilibrium p∗ (n) determined by
p∗ = arg max
p
pD (p, p∗;n) ,
where D (p, p˜;n) denotes the demand facing a firm charging a price p when all others
charge the (equilibrium) price p˜. When the number of downstream firms n is large
enough, the firms are sufficiently close to each other as to fight actively for market
share; in that case, the demand is given by:
D (p, p˜;n) = DH (p, p˜;n) ≡ 1
n
− p− p˜
t
.
12Allowing for secret, possibly discriminatory licensing terms might give the IP owner an incentive
to behave opportunistically and issue more licenses than it would otherwise. See Hart and Tirole
(1990), O’Brien and Shaffer (1992) and McAfee and Schwartz (1994), or Rey and Tirole (2007) for
an overview of this literature.
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Competition then drives the price down to the standard Hotelling competitive level:
pH (n) ≡ t
n
.
This competitive price characterizes the equilibrium when, at that price, all con-
sumers strictly prefer to buy. This is the case when the ”generalized price”, taking
into account the transportation cost, is lower than consumers’ reservation value, r,
even for the consumers that are the farthest away. Since the maximal distance be-
tween a consumer and the closest firm is equal to t/2n, the Hotelling price constitutes
the equilibrium price when
pH (n) +
t
2n
=
3t
2n
< r,
or
n > n ≡ 3
2
t
r
. (1)
When this condition is satisfied, each downstream firm thus earns a profit (gross of
the licensing fee) equal to
piH (n) ≡ t
n2
− f,
and total industry profit is thus equal to:
ΠH (n) ≡ npiH (n) = t
n
− nf.
When the number of downstream is so low that condition (1) is violated, marginal
consumers are indifferent between buying or not. Indeed, when t is very large, each
downstream firm acts as a local monopoly: by setting a price p, it will serve all
consumers located at a distance x such that
p+ tx ≤ r,
and will thus face a local monopoly demand:
D (p, p∗;n) = Dm (p) ≡ 2 (r − p)
t
.
its profit (gross of the licensing fee) is then equal to
2p (r − p)
t
− f
and is maximal for the monopoly price
pm ≡ r
2
.
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This monopoly price constitutes indeed the equilibrium price when the local monopoly
markets do not overlap, that is, when marginal consumers are located at no more
than 1/2n from the firm; this is the case when
pm +
t
2n
=
r
2
+
t
2n
≥ r,
that is, when
n ≤ n ≡ t
r
. (2)
The gross profit of a downstream firm is then equal to the local monopoly profit
pim ≡ r
2
2t
− f,
and total industry profit is thus equal to:
Πm (n) ≡ npim = n
(
r2
2t
− f
)
.
Finally, when the number of downstream firms, n, lies between n and n, the whole
market is served but marginal consumers are indifferent between buying or not; the
equilibrium price then coincides with the industry optimal pricing policy (conditional
on the number of firms n),
pˆ (n) = r − t
2n
.
In contrast with the above ”Hotelling” case, the equilibrium price here increases
with the number of firms. This is due to the already mentioned fact that increasing
the number of downstream firms increases variety, which enhances consumers’ de-
mand and allows here firms to take advantage of ”niche” strategies. The downstream
equilibrium moreover replicates the outcome of a fully integrated monopolist. Total
industry profit is thus equal to Πˆ (n) and each downstream firm earns a gross profit
equal to
pˆi (n) ≡ Πˆ (n)
n
=
r
n
− t
2n2
− f,
which, since n > n, decreases as n increases:
pˆi′ (n) = − r
n2
+
t
n3
=
r
n3
(n− n) < 0
We can thus describe the downstream equilibrium price, p∗ (n), and aggregate
profit, Π∗ (n), as follows:
for n < n =
t
r
, p∗ (n) = pm =
r
2
and Π∗ (n) = Πm (n) = n
(
r2
2t
− f
)
,
for n ≤ n ≤ n = 3
2
t
r
, p∗ (n) = pˆ (n) = r − t
2n
and Π∗ (n) = Πˆ (n) = r − t
2n
− nf,
for n > n, p∗ (n) = pH (n) =
t
n
and Π∗ (n) = ΠH (n) =
t
n
− nf.
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In particular, as n increases:
• The profit of a downstream firm (gross of the licensing fee φ),
pi∗ (n) =
Π∗ (n)
n
,
first remains constant at the local monopoly level, pim (as long as n remains
below n) and then strictly decreases: pˆi (n) decreases with n when n > n, and
piH (n) always decreases with n.
• Consumer surplus first increases proportionally to the number of firms, then
decreases when n lies between n and n, before increasing again.13
This model of horizontal differentiation thus reflects the various aspects discussed
above: an increase in the number of competitors benefits consumers and dissipates
profit when Hotelling-type competition prevails (that is, when n > n), but it can also
allow firms to extract a bigger share of consumers’ benefit from variety, resulting in
higher prices that reduce consumer surplus (when n ∈ [n, n]).14
4.1.2 Optimal and equilibrium access fees
We now characterize the privately optimal licensing fee, φΠ, which maximizes the
profit of the upstream firm. From the above analysis of downstream competition,
each licensee’s profit decreases monotonically from pim = r2/2t − f > 0 to 0 as the
number of firms increases; the IP owner can thus determine the number of downstream
firms by adjusting the licensing fee φ:
• if the upstream IP owner sets φ > pim, no firm enters the market;
• if instead the IP owner sets φ = pim, any n ≤ n firms would be willing to enter;
it is then optimal for the IP owner to let as many firms as possible enter the
market (i.e., n = n), since the IP owner’s profit is proportional to the number
of licenses issued (since pim > 0) – the IP owner can moreover achieve this by
offering if needed an arbitrarily small discount below pim;
13Consumer surplus is equal to 2n
∫ xm
0
txdx = nr2/4t where xm is the distance to the marginal
consumer, i.e., xm = r2t , for n < n, to 2n
∫ 1/2n
0
txdx = t/4n for n ≤ n ≤ n and to r− t/4n−p∗ (n) =
r − 5t/4n for n > n.
14Chen and Riordan (2007) provide another model of differentiated products competition with
this feature.
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• last, if the IP owner sets φ < pim, then there exists a unique n such that
pi∗ (n) = φ; this licensing fee thus triggers a unique continuation equilibrium
where, at stages 2 and 3, n downstream firms enter (ignoring again integer
problems) and set a price p∗ (n).
Thus, as before, the licensing fee φ allows the upstream IP owner to control the
number n of downstream firms, by setting the licensing fee to φ∗ (n) = pi∗ (n), and
to recover all the downstream profits. The optimal licensing fee will thus induce the
number of firms n that maximizes the industry profit:
max
n
nφ∗ (n) = Π∗ (n) .
Without loss of generality, we can furthermore restrict attention to n ≥ n. Conversely,
intense downstream competition dissipates profit: ΠH (n) decreases as n increases;
the upstream firm will thus never choose n > n. In the range [n, n], the industry profit
coincides with the integrated monopoly profit
(
Π∗ (n) = Πˆ (n)
)
, which is concave and
maximal for n = nM . Therefore, the industry profit is globally quasi-concave and the
upstream firm will thus find it optimal to induce the entry of nΠ downstream firms,
where
nΠ ≡ min{nM , n} .
Indeed, if it could control prices as well as the number of the downstream firms, the
IP owner would choose to let nM firms enter the market. However, having that many
firms in the downstream market can trigger price competition and dissipate profits:
this occurs when nM > n, in which case the IP owner prefers that only n firms enter
the market.
It can be checked that nM ≥ n if and only if:
r2
tf
≥ 9
2
.
Therefore, the IP holder makes positive profits whenever the industry is viable (i.e.,
r2/tf > 2):
• when 2 < r2/tf ≤ 9/2, nΠ = nM ≤ n and thus Π∗ (nΠ) = ΠM > 0;
• when instead r2/tf > 9/2, nΠ = n < nM and thus Π∗ (nΠ) < ΠM but:
Π∗
(
nΠ
)
= Π∗ (n) =
(
r2
tf
− 9
4
)
2tf
r
> 0.
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In both cases, the IP owner will generate the (constrained) optimal number nΠ
of downstream firms by setting
φΠ = pi∗
(
nΠ
)
.
We can now compare the privately optimal number of downstream firms, nΠ,
with the socially desirable one, nW , which could be achieved by setting the
licensing fee to
φW ≡ pi∗ (nW ) .
As long as n > nW , the IP owner issues too many licenses: either nM , if
n > nM > nW , or n, if nM > n > nW . If instead nW > n, downstream
competition would dissipate profits not only with nM competitors, but also with
the (smaller) number of competitors that would be socially desirable, nW ; in
that case, the IP owner excessively restricts entry, in order to limit downstream
competition. Even in this case, though, a positive licensing fee is required to
induce the socially desirable number of downstream firms, since:
φW = pi∗
(
nW
)
= piH
(
nW
)
=
t
(nW )2
− f = 3f > 0.
This positive license fee is needed to prevent the ”excessive entry” that would
otherwise derive from a ”business stealing” effect, each downstream firm failing
to take into account that (some of) the customers it serves would otherwise be
served anyway by other firms.
It can be checked that nW ≥ n if and only if:
r2
tf
≥ 9,
which leads to:15
Proposition 2 Suppose that the market is viable: r2/tf ≥ 2. Then:
• if in addition r2/tf > 9, the IP owner lets too few firms enter the downstream
market;
• if instead r2/tf < 9, the IP owner lets too many firms enter the downstream
market.
15In the second case (2 < r2/tf < 9), the socially desirable number of downstream firms may
yield negative industry profits; taking into account a budget constraint (Π ≥ 0) would then call for
a higher number of firms, nˆW > nW , which would however remain larger than nΠ.
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Thus, when variety is ”cheap” (i.e., the fixed cost f is small) and/or ”not highly
regarded” (i.e., the transportation cost t is small, implying that variety is not very
valuable) compared with the intrinsic value of the good (as measured by r), the up-
stream IP holder issues too few licences: it would be desirable in that situation to
have more firms in the downstream market, but competition would then dissipate the
profits that the IP owner can recover. When instead variety is costly and/or partic-
ularly viable (i.e., f and t are substantial), the IP holder encourages too many firms
to enter the downstream market: despite competition, the increase in variety leads
downstream firms to charge higher prices, in order to extract marginal consumers’
gain from variety, which overall increases the industry profit.
This ambiguity in the comparison between the privately and socially desirable
numbers of firms reflects a similar ambiguity for the licensing fees: the IP owner will
seek to charge an excessively high fee when r2/tf > 9, but will charge instead too
low a fee when r2/tf < 9.
Finally, it can be noted that the IP owner’s inability to fully control the down-
stream firms’ pricing policies limits the risk of excessive entry. In the present set-up,
where a fully integrated industry would generate more variety than is socially desir-
able (i.e., nW < nM), the IP owner’s inability to prevent profit dissipation through
Hotelling-like product market competition leads it to somewhat limit the number of
downstream firms, which, in turn, reduces the scope for excessive entry (e.g., when
nΠ < nW < nM).
4.2 Alternative licensing arrangements
We have so far focussed on fixed licensing fees. We now briefly discuss alternative
arrangements, such as volume-based access fees or royalty percentages.
4.2.1 Royalties
We first note that replacing fixed fees with revenue-based royalties does not affect the
analysis. Suppose indeed that, instead of a fixed licensing fee φ, the IP holder asks
for a percentage τ of downstream revenues. If n firms enter the downstream market
and the other firms charge the same price p˜, a downstream firm then maximizes
(1− τ) pD (p, p˜;n)− f,
which leads to the same best response as before and thus, given n, to the same
equilibrium price p∗ (n). Each firm thus gets:
(1− τ) [pi∗ (n) + f ]− f = (1− τ) pi∗ (n)− τf,
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which decreases as τ or n increases. Free entry yields the following relationship be-
tween the royalty rate τ and the equilibrium number of firms n:
τ = τ ∗ (n) ≡ pi
∗ (n)
pi∗ (n) + f
.
The expression τ ∗ (n) decreases as n increases.16 The IP holder can thus fully control
n by charging setting the rate to τ ∗ (n) and, since free-entry drive downstream profits
to zero, the IP holder recovers as before the whole aggregate profit Π∗ (n). The IP
holder will thus issue nΠ licenses, by charging a rate τΠ ≡ τ (nΠ). There will therefore
be too many or too few licences, depending on whether r2 ≶ 9tf . Likewise, since
τ ∗ (n) decreases as n increases in the relevant range [n, n], the IP owner will seek to
charge too low (if r2 < 9tf) or too high (if r2 > 9tf) royalty rates.
4.2.2 Unit fees
In contrast, the IP holder can achieve the fully integrated monopoly outcome through
the use of volume-based access fees or royalties where, say, a downstream firm pays
a per-unit fee γ to the IP holder. We show this informally here, and provide a formal
proof in the Appendix. Note first that the IP owner will always ensure that the
market is served. Indeed, if the entire market was not served, each downstream
firm would have a market share, say α, lower than 1/n, and would thus act a local
monopolist (given its ”marginal cost” γ); the IP owner’s profit would thus be equal
to
ΠU = γnα.
But then, given γ and α, the IP owner would issue as many licenses as needed to ”just”
cover the market: doing so would not alter the downstream firms’ ”local monopoly”
power, but would increase total coverage and thus profit.
Conversely, as long as the entire market is served, the IP owner obtains a profit
equal to γ, and thus wishes to increase γ as much as possible. And since downstream
firms’ profits are greater in the monopoly regime, the IP owner will thus choose γ
so that a local downstream monopolist would make zero profit. The local monopoly
price and profit, based on a unit cost γ, are respectively equal to:
pm (γ) ≡ arg max
p
(p− γ)Dm (p) = r + γ
2
,
pim (γ) =
(r − γ)2
2t
− f.
16The rate τ∗ increases with pi∗, which in turn decreases as n increases.
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The maximal unit fee that the IP owner can charge (for which pim (γ) = 0) is thus
equal to:
γ¯ ≡ r −
√
2tf .
But for this fee, the market price is at the fully integrated level:
pm (γ¯) = r −
√
tf
2
= pM .
This, in turn, implies that the local monopolists’ market shares yield the optimal
number of firms: marginal consumer are located at a distance xˆ such that pM+txˆ = r,
and thus each local monopolist’s market share is equal to
2xˆ = 2
r − pM
t
=
√
2f
t
;
covering the entire market thus requires a number of firms equal to:
n =
1
2xˆ
=
√
t
2f
= nM .
This leads to:
Proposition 3 Offering revenue-based royalties yields the same outcome as fixed
access fees. In contrast, offering volume-based royalties (i.e., per unit access fees)
allows the IP owner to replicate the fully integrated outcome and thus issue excessively
many licenses.
Proof. See Appendix A.
Interestingly, a volume-based fee cannot be used to sustain the socially desirable
outcome. It is shown in Appendix A that the equilibrium per-firm profit, pi∗ (n; γ),
decreases as n or γ increases. Therefore:
• any γ larger than γ¯ triggers no entry, since then, for any n, pi∗ (n; γ) ≤ pim (γ) <
0;
• γ = γ¯ triggers any n ≤ nM firms, but the market is entirely served for n = nM ;
therefore, while it is possible to sustain exactly nW firms, only part of the
market would then be served;
• and any γ < γ¯ triggers either a continuation equilibrium in which all the market
is served, since pim (γ) > (pim (γ¯) =) 0, but in which more than nM downstream
firms enter the market, since then pi∗
(
nM ; γ
)
> 017 and pi∗ (n; γ) further in-
creases (up to pim (γ)) as n decreases below nM .
17Either pi∗
(
nM ; γ
)
= pˆi
(
nM ; γ
)
> pi∗
(
nM ; γM
)
= 0, or pi∗
(
nM ; γ
)
= piC
(
nM
)
= f > 0.
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These observations moreover indicate that, while a volume-based fee cannot sus-
tain the socially desirable outcome, its private interest however leads the IP owner to
choose the ”second-best” level for such a fee: conditional on relying on volume-based
fees, the (second-)best fee γW coincides with γ¯, since any higher level would generate
no entry and any lower level would generate additional entry, from a point where
there is already excessive entry (since nM > nW ).
4.3 Vertical integration
We now suppose that the upstream monopolist is vertically integrated and thus
owns one of the downstream firms; we thus consider a case of pure vertical integra-
tion, where the integrated subsidiary still competes with the other, non-integrated
downstream firms. Clearly, vertical integration does not affect the behavior of non-
integrated downstream firms. It turns out that it does not affect the behavior of the
downstream subsidiary either, and thus has no effect on the final outcome, when the
IP holder charges either fixed or per-unit access fees; as we will see, this does not
carry over to the case of revenue royalties.
Suppose first that the IP holder charges a fixed licensing fee φ. Once it has sold
n licenses, the variable profit of the vertically integrated firm coincides with that
of its downstream subsidiary; therefore, vertical integration has no impact on its
downstream behavior. For a given total number of downstream competitors, each
unintegrated firm thus earns pi∗ (n) − φ and the number of firms is determined as
before by pi∗ (n) = φ. The integrated firm therefore earns:
pi∗ (n) + (n− 1)φ = npi∗ (n) ,
and chooses again to let nΠ firms (including its own subsidiary) enter the downstream
market.18
Suppose now that the IP holder charges instead a unit fee γ. When setting its
downstream market price p, the integrated firm takes into account that it loses γ on
18When the IP owner can deal secretly with downstream firms, vertical integration may help
avoid opportunism by the IP owner (since issuing an additional license then hurts the integrated
subsidiary as well as the other downstream competitors), in which case it may result in fewer licenses
being issued.
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any unit taken away from its rivals; more precisely, it will maximize:19
pD (p, p˜;n) + γ [1−D (p, p˜;n)] ,
which amounts to maximizing
(p− γ)D (p, p˜;n) ,
exactly as do the other, unintegrated competitors. Vertical integration thus again
does not affect the pricing behavior of the downstream subsidiary. The downstream
equilibrium still remains the same as before, and the integrated firm can thus obtain
the monopoly profit ΠM by setting γ = γM .20 We thus have:
Proposition 4 Vertical integration does not affect the equilibrium outcome when the
licensing terms consist of either fixed or per unit access fees.
Remark: revenue-based royalties. Vertical integration affects the outcome when
the IP owner relies on revenue-based royalty percentages: in that case, the integrated
firm maximizes
pD (p, p˜;n) + τ p˜ [1−D (p, p˜;n)]
and is thus less aggressive than the others. The downstream equilibrium is then a
bit more complex to characterize, since the reduction in the competitive pressure
is greater for the integrated subsidiary’s immediate neighbors than for the other
unintegrated firms, and is asymmetric, the integrated firm’s downstream subsidiary
having a lower market share than the unintegrated firms. Such royalty schemes thus
lead to an inefficient allocation of consumers among the existing firms; they can
moreover lead to an inefficient distribution of firms along the circle, since locations
closer to the integrated firm downstream subsidiary are more profitable.
19This assumes that the entire market is served, which is the case in equilibrium (since the
IP holder has always an incentive to issue sufficiently many licenses to cover the market). More
generally, vertical integration could affect downstream pricing behavior when prices affect total
demand as well as market shares.
20It is always optimal for the IP holder to let enough downstream firms enter to cover the entire
market. For a given fee γ and associated number of firms n, the total profit of the integrated IP
holder is then equal to (using the free-entry condition)
p∗ (n)
n
+ γ
(
1− 1
n
)
=
p∗ (n)− γ
n
+ γ = f + γ.
The integrated IP holder thus wishes to maximize γ, as when there is no vertical integration.
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4.4 Recap
The above analysis can be summarized as follows:
• When the IP holder relies on fixed licensing fees, with or without vertical inte-
gration, or on royalty percentages without integration, it cannot fully ”control”
the intensity of downstream competition and, as a result, cannot achieve the
fully integrated outcome; it may still issue too many licenses by charging too
low fees but, when competition is a serious concern, it issues instead too few
licenses or, equivalently, charges too high fees for these licenses.
• When instead the IP holder asks for volume-based royalties, with or without
vertical integration, the per-unit access fee allows the IP holder to control the
intensity of downstream competition and achieve the fully integrated outcome;
it then issues more licenses than is socially desirable. In that case, however,
altering the level of the unit fee can only decrease total welfare.
This model can also be used to address the following question: suppose that one
cannot ”regulate” the actual level of the licensing terms (i.e. the amount of the fee or
the royalty rate), but still dictate the type of licensing arrangement (e.g., fixed fees
versus revenue-based or volume-based royalties); which type of arrangement works
best for society?
Insisting on fixed licensing fees or revenue-based royalties leads the IP owner (with
or without vertical integration in the first case, and without integration in the second
case) to issue nΠ = min
{
n, nM
}
licenses, whereas allowing for alternative (e.g.,
volume-based fees) and more profitable licensing schemes leads instead the IP owner
(with or without vertical integration) to issue nM > nW licenses. As a result, allowing
for more flexible licensing schemes has no impact on the number of licensees and thus
on welfare when nΠ = nM (> n), and instead increases the number of licensees (from
n to nM) when nΠ = n < nM ; in that case, this can decrease welfare (e. g., if nW < n,
since in that case nΠ is already excessively high) but may increase it as well when n
is low enough.21
5 Uncertainty and regulatory bias
We now consider whether uncertainty about upstream (innovation) or downstream
costs and values may lead the regulator to jack up or down the level of the licensing
21This is for example the case for t = r = 2f .
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fee.
Generally speaking, suppose that the welfare function depends on the licensing
fee φ and on an uncertain variable θ, and that the regulator must choose φ before
knowing the realization of the uncertainty about θ. The regulator will thus seek to
solve (where E [.] denotes to the expectation operator, for the distribution of θ):
max
φ
E
[
W˜ (φ, θ)
]
,
where
W˜ (φ, θ)
denotes the ex post level of welfare, conditional on the realization of the random
variable θ.
Assuming that the welfare function W˜ is continuously differentiable and concave
with respect to φ, the optimal fee φ∗ is then characterized by the first-order condition
E
[
∂φW˜ (φ
∗, θ)
]
= 0.
In contrast, in the absence of uncertainty (i.e., if the variable θ was always equal to
its mean value E [θ]), the regulator would choose the licensing fee so as to maximize
max
φ
W˜ (φ,E [θ]) ,
leading to a fee φ∗∗ characterized by the first-order condition
∂φW˜ (φ
∗∗, E [θ]) = 0.
Now, if ∂φW˜ is concave with respect to θ, we have:
∂φW˜ (φ
∗∗, E [θ]) = 0 = E
[
∂φW˜ (φ
∗, θ)
]
< ∂φW˜ (φ
∗, E [θ]) ,
and thus (since ∂φW˜ is decreasing with respect to φ, by the assumed concavity of W˜
in φ):
φ∗ < φ∗∗,
implying that the introduction of uncertainty should introduce a ”statistical bias”
towards lower licensing fees. Conversely, if ∂φW˜ is convex with respect to θ, we have:
φ∗ > φ∗∗.
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5.1 Cost uncertainty
The socially optimal number of firms, nW , depends here on supply side characteristics
through the level of the fixed cost, f . We now study the implications of uncertainty
about this fixed cost (i.e., θ ≡ f). Suppose for example that f is distributed over
some interval
[
f, f
]
according to a cdf F (.), and that:
• the regulator must choose the licensing fee φ before knowing the particular
realization of the fixed cost f ;
• but firms choose whether to enter once the uncertainty is resolved.
For the purpose of simplifying the exposition, we suppose that the socially de-
sirable number of downstream firms is always large enough to ensure that Hotelling
competition prevails (that is, f < r2/9t). We therefore focus here on the case when
an unregulated IP holder would issue too few licenses.
Ex post, given the licensing fee φ and the realized cost of entry f , the number of
firms, n (φ+ f) is determined by
pi∗ (n; f) = piH (n; f) = φ
and is thus equal to:
n (φ, f) =
√
t
f + φ
.
The welfare is thus equal to
W˜ (φ, f) = r − t
4n (φ, f)
− n (φ, f) f
= r − φ+ 5f
4
√
t
f + φ
.
Therefore,
∂φW˜ (φ, f) = − φ− 3f
8 (f + φ)
√
t
f + φ
.
This function is concave around the optimal value in the absence of uncertainty (that
is, for f around to φ/3), but not for larger deviations:
∂f
(
∂φW˜ (φ, f)
)
=
3
16
3φ− f
(f + φ)2
√
t
f + φ
,
∂2f2
(
∂φW˜ (φ, f)
)
=
3
32
3f − 17φ
(f + φ)3
√
t
f + φ
.
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Thus, ∂φW˜ is concave in f as long as f remains below 17φ/3, but becomes convex
beyond this threshold. The introduction of limited uncertainty about the downstream
fixed cost f should thus lead the regulator to insist on a lower licensing fee than what
would be optimal based on the ”expected value” of this fixed cost, but the possibility
of ”really bad shocks” on the fixed cost f might instead encourage the regulator to
consider higher licensing fees.
5.2 Demand uncertainty
In this simple Hotelling framework, the reservation price r does not influence the
optimal number of firms nW , which depends on the demand side only through the
differentiation parameter t. Let us therefore introduce some uncertainty on t (i.e.,
θ ≡ t). Since the transportation cost t enters the welfare function in a linear form, at
first glance uncertainty about this parameter should not affect the optimal number
of firms:
n∗ = max
n
Et [W (n, t)] = max
n
Et
[
r − t
4n
− nf
]
= max
n
(
r − Et [t]
4n
− nf
)
= n∗∗.
However, in practice the regulator controls the licensing fee, which only indirectly
determines the number of firms; moreover, this control depends also on the degree
of differentiation t. As a result, expressed as a function of the licensing fee φ, the
welfare function is no longer linear in t; using the same computation as before,22 we
have:
W˜ (φ, t) = r − φ+ 5f
4
√
t
f + φ
,
and
∂φW˜ (φ, t) = − (φ− 3f)
8 (f + φ)
√
t
f + φ
,
which is convex in t. Thus, because it controls the number of firms only indirectly,
and is sensitive to the degree of differentiation when exerting this control, the intro-
duction of uncertainty over this parameter would lead the regulator to consider higher
licensing fees, compared with what would be optimal in the absence of uncertainty.
22We thus assume again that the Hotelling competition regime always prevails for the optimal
number of firms, which is the case when the upper bound on t is lower than r2/9f .
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5.3 Regulating licensing fees or the number of licenses?
Rather than setting the level of the licensing fee, the regulator could control the
number of licenses. Since
W (n, t, f) = r − t
4n
− nf
is linear in t and f , we have:
Et,f [W (n, t, f)] = W (n, t
e, f e) ,
where te ≡ Et [t] and f e ≡ Ef [f ] denote respectively the expected values of the
transportation cost t and the fixed cost f .
A regulator that would control the number of licenses would choose
nW (te, f e) =
√
te
4f e
,
thus generating an expected welfare equal to
Et,f
[
W
(
nW (te, f e) , t, f
)]
= W
(
nW (te, f e) , te, f e
)
= max
n
W (n, te, f e) .
When instead the regulator sets the licensing fee, it seeks to maximize
Et,f
[
W˜ (φ, t, f)
]
,
where, assuming as before that Hotelling competition prevails:23
W˜ (φ, t, f) = r − φ+ 5f
4
√
t
f + φ
is convex in each of t and f ; indeed, we have:
∂W˜
∂t
= − φ+ 5f
8
√
t (f + φ)
and thus
∂2W˜
∂t2
=
φ+ 5f
16t
√
t (f + φ)
> 0,
and
∂W˜
∂f
=
1
4
(
φ+ 5f
2 (f + φ)
− 5
)√
t
f + φ
= − 5f + 9φ
8 (f + φ)
√
t
f + φ
,
23This is the case when the upper bounds on the transportation parameter and on the fixed cost,
t¯ and f¯ , satisfy t¯f¯ < r2/9.
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so that
∂2W˜
∂f 2
= −
(
10 (f + φ)− 2 (5f + 9φ)− (5f + 9φ)
8 (f + φ)2
)√
t
f + φ
=
5f + 17φ
16 (f + φ)2
√
t
f + φ
> 0.
Therefore, for θ = t or f and φ˜ (θe) ≡ arg maxφ W˜ (φ, θe):
max
φ
Eθ
[
W˜ (φ, θ)
]
≥ Eθ
[
W˜
(
φ˜ (θe) , θ
)]
> W˜
(
φ˜ (θe) , θe
)
≡ max
φ
W˜ (φ, θe)
= max
n
W (n; θe)
= max
n
Eθ [W (n; θ)] .
It is therefore preferable to regulate the licensing fee φ rather than the number of
licenses n.
This discussion can be summarized as follows:
Proposition 5 Suppose that random shocks affect either the fixed cost f or the trans-
portation parameter t, and the upper bounds on these parameters, t¯ and f¯ , satisfy
9t¯f¯ < r2, so that an unregulated IP holder would issue fewer licenses than is socially
desirable. Then:
• It is preferable to regulate the licensing fee φ rather than the number of licenses
n.
• Compared with the situation with no random shocks:
– uncertainty over t, and possibly a large uncertainty on f , increases the
optimal licensing fee;
– limited uncertainty about the fixed cost f instead decreases the optimal
licensing fee.
This discussion is reminiscent of the debate on price versus quantity regulation,
pioneered by Weitzman (1974).24 More generally, the optimal mode of intervention
24A related discussion concerns input versus output control. See Caillaud et al. (1988) for an
early survey of the literature on utility regulation.
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depends critically on the information available (or the information that could be
made available, and at what cost) as well as on the regulatory toolbox (e.g., which
transfers are allowed, whether discrimination is possible, to what extent can the
regulator commit itself, and so forth).25 A detailed analysis of these issues is however
beyond the scope of the present paper.
6 Complementary technologies
We now consider a situation where two upstream firms, U1 and U2, which each control
an essential technology. These two technologies are perfect complements: combined
together, they allow firms to compete in the downstream market, and each of them
is necessary to be active in that market. We first assume that the IP holders are
not themselves present in the downstream market and consider different types of
commercial arrangements.
6.1 Pool
A first possibility for the two IP holders is to ”merge”, e.g. by assigning their IP
rights to a pool that sells the technology for them and retrocedes the profits, say on
a fifty-fifty basis. The situation is formally the same as the one studied before, since
the pool manager will behave exactly as does the single IP holder described in the
previous section.
For example, if the pool manager relies on a fixed licensing fee φ, it can still
control the number of firms n and recover downstream profits by setting the fee to
φ∗ (n) = pi∗ (n). The pool manager then seeks to maximize each owner’s profit, equal
to
n
φ∗ (n)
2
=
Π∗ (n)
2
,
and will thus again maximize total profit by selling nΠ licenses for a fee φ = φΠ.
Likewise, in the case of revenue-based royalties the pool manager would issue the
same number of licenses, nΠ, by setting the royalty rate to τ = τΠ. The pool manager
could also replicate the fully integrated outcome by charging instead a unit fee γ = γ¯.
25Laffont and Tirole (1993) provide a broad overview on regulation theory and incentives.
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6.2 Independent IP licensing with fixed license fees
We now suppose instead that the two IP holders each market their own rights inde-
pendently from each other. To fix ideas, we will consider the following timing, with
the same structure as the one previously studied:
• First, each IP owner, i = 1, 2, simultaneously and independently sets a license
fee, φi.
• Second, potential entrants decide whether or not to buy the licenses; as before,
those that enter locate themselves uniformly along the circle.
• Third, downstream competitors set prices.
As already noted, independent licensing creates double marginalization problems
and leads to higher total fees. It may even trigger a ”coordination breakdown” where
both IP owners charge prohibitively high fees, thereby discouraging any downstream
firm from entering the market: any pair of fees satisfying φi ≥ pim, for i = 1, 2,
constitutes an equilibrium. Such equilibria rely on weakly dominated strategies; we
will therefore focus our discussion on equilibria in which each IP owner charges a fee
below the monopoly profit pim.
Given its rival’s equilibrium fee φe < pim, Ui can induce the entry of ni firms by
setting its own fee to φ∗i (ni), such that
pi∗ (ni) = φi + φe. (3)
That is, φ∗i (ni) = pi
∗ (ni)− φe. Each Ui will thus will want to choose ni (or φi) so as
to maximize:
Πi = niφ
∗
i (ni) = ni (pi
∗ (ni)− φe) = Π∗ (ni)− niφe.
We show in the Appendix that the unique equilibrium (excluding weakly dominated
strategies) is symmetric (φ1 = φ2 = φ
D, where the superscript D stands for ”Double
marginalization”) and leads to a number of firms equal to:
nD ≡ r
2f
(√
1 + 6
tf
r2
− 1
)
,
which is such that n ≤ nD < nΠ = min{nM , n}. We thus have:
Proposition 6 When the IP holders rely on fixed access fees, independent licensing
leads to higher fees and fewer downstream firms than joint licensing.
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Proof. See Appendix. B
Because of double marginalization, independent licensing thus reduces the number
of licenses that are eventually issued. This may enhance social welfare here, since joint
licensing can lead to excessively many firms. Yet, independent licensing can also result
in too few licenses. We show in the Appendix that, indeed, nD < nW when:
r2
tf
>
25
4
.
This therefore only happens when variety is cheap (f small) and/or not very inter-
esting (t small), compared with the intrinsic value of the good (as measured by r).
More precisely:
• when r2/tf > 9, joint licensing would already generate too few licenses (nΠ = n < nW );
independent licensing then reduces welfare, since double marginalization further
reduces the number of licenses below the optimal level
(
nD < n < nW
)
;
• in contrast, when r2/tf < 25/4 (but r2/tf > 2, to ensure the viability of the
market), even independent licensing generates too many licenses; the associated
double marginalization then brings the number of licensees closer to what is
socially desirable and improves welfare
(
nW < nD < nΠ
)
;
• in the intermediate range where 9 > r2/tf > 25/4, double marginalization still
reduces the number of licensees, but joint licensing would lead to too many
licenses; independent licensing may thus improve welfare.26
Remark: cross-licensing. The IP holders could instead opt for cross-licensing
agreements allowing them to issue ”complete” licenses covering both technologies
subject to paying the other IP holder a fee per license issued. We show in Appendix
C that a reciprocal cross-licensing agreement allowing both of them to issue complete
licenses by paying the other a fee equal to ψ = φΠ/2, leads them to issue nM complete
licenses at a fee Φ = 2ψ = φΠ, thereby replicating the integrated monopoly outcome
and sharing equally the associated profit. Indeed, when the reciprocal fee ψ is low
enough, Bertrand competition between the two upstream firms leads them to set their
fees to
Φ1 = Φ2 = Φ ≡ 2ψ,
26By continuity, there is a threshold ρˆ for ρ = r2/tf , such that ρˆ ∈ (25/4, 9), such that, compared
with joint licensing, independent licensing and the associated double marginalization reduces welfare
if ρ > ρˆ, but instead enhances welfare if ρ < ρˆ.
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since each Ui is then indifferent between issuing a license and earning Φ − ψ = ψ,
or letting the other IP holder issue the license and learning ψ again. As a result, by
adjusting the upstream cross-licensing fee ψ to φΠ/2, they can drive the downstream
licensing fee Φ = 2ψ to φΠ. The situation is then formally the same as when they
merge or form a pool to market their IPs.
If instead each Ui independently sets its upstream fee ψi, then cross-licensing may
again mitigate double marginalization problems and result in more downstream firms
than nD, but do not eliminate them entirely and still results in fewer firms than nΠ
(see Appendix C).
Remark: Consumer surplus
An upstream monopoly IP owner will always choose nΠ, while a duopoly results
in nD < nΠ firms. Double marginalization thus reduces variety, but it also results in
lower downstream prices and greater consumer surplus. Indeed, whenever the market
is viable (i.e., r
2
tf
> 2), we have: n ≤ nD < nΠ ≤ n and, in this range, the consumer
price is equal to pˆ(n) = r− t
2n
and increases with n, while consumer surplus is given
by
CS (n) = r − (r − t
2n
)− 2n
1
2n∫
0
txdx =
t
4n
,
and thus decreases with n. Therefore:
• Compared with the case of an upstream monopoly or an IP pool, an upstream
IP duopoly results in fewer downstream firms and lower downstream prices
facing consumers; the benefits of the lower prices more than offsets the effects
of reduced variety, so consumer surplus is higher with an IP duopoly.
• This duopoly outcome may even be better than ”free-entry” (i.e., the number of
downstream firms obtained with free licenses), unless this free-entry equilibrium
results in significantly more than n firms.27
27Consumer surplus decreases with n in the range [n, n] and then increases with n for n > n.
Let denote by nf the number of firms entering the downstream market when licenses are free (i.e.,
such that pi∗
(
nf
)
= 0) and by nˆ > n the number of firms that yields as much surplus as nD. Then,
as long as nf ≤ nˆ (that is, when f is “large enough”), the outcome of IP duopoly and double
marginalization is better for consumers than the free entry equilibrium – in that case, the number of
firms that maximize consumer surplus, subject to non-negative profit constraint, is n; when nf > nˆ,
however, consumers would prefer to have “as many firms” as possible and free-entry would work
beter for them.
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6.3 Alternative licensing arrangements
6.3.1 Royalties
Suppose now that the IP holders ask for royalty percentages τ1 and τ2 on downstream
revenues, so that the total royalty rate is τ = τ1 + τ2.
As long as the number of downstream firms exceeds n, a downstream firm earns
a profit equal to
(1− τ) t
n2
− f,
so that the number of downstream firms is equal to
n (τ) =
√
(1− τ) t
f
,
which decreases as τ increases. Each Ui gets
Πi = τi
t
n (τ)
= τi
√
tf
1− τ1 − τ2 ,
which clearly increases with τi.
Therefore, each IP holder will seek to induce at most n downstream firms to enter.
The downstream equilibrium price and individual profit will thus be equal to
p = pˆ (n) = r − t
2n
,
pi = (1− τ) 1
n
(
r − t
2n
)
− f = (1− τ) pˆi (n)− τf.
The number of downstream firms, n (τ), is thus such that
pˆi (n) =
τf
1− τ . (4)
This number decreases as τ increases (i.e., n′ (τ) < 0), since pˆi′ (n) < 0 while the
right-hand side increases with τ . Each Ui gets (with n = n (τ)):
Πi = τipˆ (n) = τin [pˆi (n) + f ] . (5)
Using
0 = (1− τ) 1
n
(
r − t
2n
)
− f = (1− τj) [pˆi (n) + f ]− f − τi [pˆi (n) + f ] ,
Ui’s profit can be rewritten as
Πi = (1− τj)n [pˆi (n) + f ]− f = (1− τj)
[
Πˆ (n)− n τjf
1− τj
]
.
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Therefore, there is again some double marginalization (reflected in the last term of
the right-hand side in the above equation) which lead the IP owners to limit the of
licenses. It it shown in Appendix B that this double marginalization is less severe here
than with flat rate license fees; letting nR denote the number of licenses generated
by independent licensing and percentage royalties, we have:
Proposition 7 When relying on percentage royalties, independent licensing creates
again double marginalization problems, which are however less severe than in the case
fixed access fees: we have
nD < nR ≤ nΠ,
with strict inequalities whenever nΠ < nM .
Proof. See Appendix B.
6.3.2 Unit fees
Suppose now that the IP holders charge instead unit fees (i.e., volume-based royalties)
γ1 and γ2, so that the total unit fee is γ = γ1 +γ2. As long as γ < γ, the entire market
market is served; therefore, each IP holder i gets
Πi = γi,
which clearly increases with γi. In contrast, when γ > γ, no entry occurs and thus
Π1 = Π2 = 0; last, when γ = γ, there are enough firms willing to enter to serve the
entire market, and the total profits are
Π1 + Π2 = Π
M .
As a result, the equilibrium is such that γ = γ, and the two IP holders share the
integrated monopoly profit.28 In order words, double marginalization does not pre-
clude here the IP holders from maximizing their joint profits, and they issue as many
licenses as is privately optimal
(
n = nM
)
.
We thus have:
Proposition 8 When relying on unit-fees, the IP holders can replicate the fully in-
tegrated outcome, whether they license their technologies jointly or independently.
28There is actually an infinity of equilibria, which only differ in the way the profit ΠM is shared
among the two IP holders: any couple of fees γ1 and γ2 adding-up to γ¯ constitutes an equilibrium.
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6.4 Vertical integration
Suppose now that the two IP holders are each vertically integrated. That is, they
each have a downstream subsidiary, and the two subsidiaries compete with the other,
unintegrated firms that are present in the downstream market.
6.4.1 Fixed licensing fees
If the IP holders sell their technologies for a fixed fee φ, then clearly vertical inte-
gration has again no impact on their behavior and thus on the final outcome. To see
this, first note that each downstream affiliate behaves in the same way as unintegrated
downstream competitors. Given the license fee φ set for example by the pool manager
in the case of joint licensing, or the total fee φ = φ1 + φ2 set by the two IP holders
in the case of independent licensing, the total number n of downstream competitors
thus remains characterized by pi∗ (n) = φ (with the caveat that, by assumption, at
least two firms enter the market).
Therefore, if the IP holders jointly license their technology through a pool, which
redistributes half of its profit to each of the two upstream firms, the pool manager
will set φ, or equivalently pick the total number of firms n by setting φ = pi∗ (n), so
as to maximize
pi∗ (n) +
(n− 2)φ
2
= pi∗ (n) +
(n− 2) pi∗ (n)
2
=
npi∗ (n)
2
=
Π∗ (n)
2
.
The pool manager will thus again maximize total profits and chooses n = nΠ.
If instead the IP holders license their technology independently, given the rival’s
equilibrium license fee φe, each Ui can still ”choose” a total number of firms ni by
charging a fee φ∗i (ni) = pi
∗ (ni)− φe. Ui thus maximizes:
pi∗ (ni)− φe + (ni − 1)φ∗i (ni) = pi∗ (ni)− φe + (ni − 1) (pi∗ (ni)− φe)
= Π∗ (ni)− niφe,
as before. The licensing behavior of an IP holder is thus the same, whether it is
integrated or not. As a result, the equilibrium outcome is the same, whether the IP
holders are vertically integrated or not (the same observation carries over to the case
where only one IP holder is vertically integrated).
6.4.2 Unit fees
Suppose now that the IP holders charge per-unit access fees. Vertical integration still
has no impact on downstream competition. For example, in the case of independent
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licensing Ui will set its downstream market price pi so as to maximize (with j 6= i =
1, 2, and as long as the entire market is served):
(pi − γj)D (pi, p˜;n) + γi [1−D (pi, p˜;n)] ,
which is the same as maximizing (letting γ = γ1 + γ2 denote the total unit fee):
(pi − γ)D (pi, p˜;n) ,
as if the downstream subsidiary were an independent firm. Therefore, all firms,
vertically integrated or not, behave in the same way in the downstream market.
Similarly, in the case of joint licensing, and assuming for example that each subsidiary
formally pays the same fee γ as the independent firms, Ui will set its downstream
price so as to maximize:
(pi − γ)D (pi, p˜;n) + γ
2
,
which again amounts to maximize (pi − γ)D (pi, p˜;n). Therefore, in both cases, ver-
tical integration has no impact on downstream competition.
If the IP holders license their technologies jointly through a pool, the pool manager
will set the fee γ so as to maximize each IP holder’s total profit, equal to (using the
free-entry condition (p∗ − γ) /n = f):
p∗ − γ
n
+
γ
2
= f +
γ
2
,
and will thus choose the maximal acceptable value for γ (γ = γ¯).
If instead the IP holders license their technologies independently, each integrated
IP holder will maximize
p∗ − γj
n
+ γi
(
1− 1
n
)
=
p∗ − γ
n
+ γi = f + γi,
and will thus seek to increase its own fee, γi, as much as possible, as if it were not
integrated. Therefore, vertical integration has no impact on the equilibrium, which
remains such that γ = γ and the two IP holders share the fully integrated monopoly
profit.
We thus have:
Proposition 9 Vertical integration by one or both IP holders has again no impact
on the equilibrium outcome when the licensing terms stipulate fixed or per unit access
fees.
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7 Conclusion
Patent thickets have long been a concern due to the potential for delaying deployment
of products and adversely affecting consumers. To examine the implications of such
patent thickets, we consider a model in which the upstream IP owner or owners sell
into a market in which there are differentiated products and positive fixed entry costs.
It is well known that, in the absence of vertical licensing agreements, there can be
excessive entry, due to business stealing effects, or insufficient entry, if firms entering
the market appropriate only part of the surplus they generate. We revisit this issue,
taking into account the upstream owner(s)’ licensing policy.
When there is a single owner of essential IP, that owner can have an incentive
to sell more licenses than is socially optimal. This does not occur when the down-
stream licensees offer quite homogeneous products, but can occur when products are
significantly differentiated, in which case additional licensees can extract a substan-
tial share of the surplus that consumers derive from enhanced variety. When the IP
owner cannot control its licensees’ pricing policies, however, the fear of profit dissi-
pation through downstream competition tends to reduce the risk of excessive entry.
When there are two or more upstream IP owners, royalty stacking also tends to re-
duce the number of downstream licensees. But when a single IP owner (or multiple
IP owners jointly licensing their technologies) would issue too many licenses, the re-
duction in the number of downstream competitors and product variety can result
in lower prices, and higher consumer surplus and social welfare. We also find that
the IP owner(s) may sell fewer licenses than would be offered by a fully integrated
monopolist when license fees assume the form of a fixed access fee or a revenue-based
royalty percentage, but may replicate the fully integrated outcome by charging per-
unit license fees. Last, when IP owners charge fixed or unit-based access fees, vertical
integration does not alter the behavior of affiliated downstream subsidiaries, and as
a result vertical integration has no effect on the equilibrium outcome.
36
References
[1] Arrow, K.J. (1992) ”Economic welfare and the allocation of resources for inven-
tion,” in The rate and direction of incentive activity R.R. Nelson, ed., Princeton:
Princeton University Press.
[2] Caillaud, B., R. Guesnerie, P. Rey and J. Tirole (1988), ”Government inter-
vention in production and incentives theory: A review of recent contributions”,
Rand Journal of Economics, 19(1):1-26.
[3] Chen, Y. and M. Riordan (2007), ”Price and variety in the spokes model,” The
Economic Journal 117(522): 897 - 921.
[4] Cournot, A. (1838), Recherches sur les Principles Mathe´matiques de la The´orie
des Richesses, Paris: Hachette. English edition (ed. N. Bacon): Researches into
the Mathematical Principles of the Theory of Wealth, New York: Macmillan,
1987.
[5] Dixit, A., and J. E. Stiglitz (1977), ”Monopolistic Competition and Optimum
Product Diversity,” American Economic Review, 67:297-308.
[6] Erutku, C., and Y. Richelle (2006), ”Licensing a New Product with Non-Linear
Contracts,” Canadian Journal of Economics 39(3): 932-47.
[7] Faull´ı-Oller, R., and J. Sandonis, (2002) ”Welfare Reducing Licensing,” Games
and Economic Behavior 41:191-205.
[8] Geradin, D., A. Layne-Farrar and A. J. Padilla, ”Royalty Stacking in High Tech
Industries: Separating Myth from Reality,” Working Paper (12 December 2006),
available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=949599
[9] Green, J. R., and S. Scotchmer (1995), ”On the division of profit in sequential
innovation,” RAND Journal of Economics, 26(1):20-33.
[10] Heller, M. A., and R. S. Eisenberg (1998), ”Can Patents Deter Innovation? The
Anticommons in Biomedical Research,” Science, 280(5364):698-701.
[11] Herna´ndez-Murillo, R., and G. Llobet, (2006)”Patent Licensing Revisited: Het-
erogeneous Firms and Product Differentiation,” International Journal of Indus-
trial Organization 24: 149-75.
37
[12] Kamien, M. (1992), ”Patent Licensing,” Chapter 11 in Vol. I of Handbook of
Game Theory with Economic Applications, R.J. Aumann and S. eds, North Hol-
land.
[13] Kamien, M.I. and Y. Tauman (1986), ”Fees versus royalties and the private value
of a patent,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 101: 471-91.
[14] Katz, M. L. (1980), ”Multiplant Monopoly in a Spatial Market,” The Bell Jour-
nal of Economics, 11(2):519-535.
[15] Katz, M. L., and C. Shapiro (1985), ”On the Licensing of Innovations,” The
RAND Journal of Economics, 16(4):504-520.
[16] Katz, M. L., and C. Shapiro (1986), ”How to License Intangible Property,” The
Quarterly Journal of Economics, 101(3):567-590.
[17] Kiley, T. D. (1992), ”Patents on Random Complementary DNA Fragments?,”
Science, 257:915-918.
[18] Kishimoto, S.,and S. Muto (2008), ”Fee versus royalty policy in licensing through
bargaining: An application of the Nash bargaining solution,” Working paper.
[19] Kitch, E., (2003), ”Comment on the Tragedy of the Anticommons in Biomedical
Research,” Advances in Genetics, 50:271-273.
[20] Laffont, J.-J., and I. Tirole (1993), A Theory of Incentives in Procurement and
Regulation, Cambridge: MIT Press.
[21] Lemley, M., C. Shapiro (2006), ”Patent Holdup and Royalty Stacking”,
U.C. Berkeley Competition Policy Center Paper CPC07-065, available at
http://repositories.cdlib.org/iber/cpc/CPC07-065.
[22] Lichtman, D. (2006), ”Patent Holdouts in the Standard-Setting Process”, Aca-
demic Advisory Council Bulletin, 1.3, May 2006.
[23] Mankiw, G., and M. Whinston (1986), ”Free Entry and Social Inefficiency,”
Rand Journal of Economics, 17:48-58.
[24] Muto, S., (1993) ”On Licensing Policies in Bertrand Competition,” Games and
Economic Behavior 5: 257-67.
38
[25] Rey, P., and J. Tirole (2007), ”A Primer on Foreclosure,” in vol. III of Handbook
of Industrial Organization, M. Armstrong and R. Porter eds, North Holland,
2006.
[26] Salop, S. C. (1979), ”Monopolistic Competition with Outside Goods,” Bell Jour-
nal of Economics, 10(1):141-156.
[27] Schankerman, M., and M. Noel (2006), ”Strategic Patenting and Software Inno-
vation,” LSE CEP Discussion Paper No 7402006.
[28] Scotchmer, S. (1991), ”Standing on the Shoulders of Giants: Cumulative Re-
search and the Patent Law,” Journal of Economic Perspectives, 5(1):29-41.
[29] Scotchmer, S., and P. Menell (2005), ”Intellectual Property,” in Handbook of Law
and Economics, M. Polinsky and S. Shavell, eds., Amsterdam:Elsevier, forthcom-
ing.
[30] Sen, D (2005), ”Fee versus royalty reconsidered,” Games and Economic Behavior
53:141-47.
[31] Shapiro, C. (2001), ”Navigating the Patent Ticket: Cross Licenses, Patent Pools,
and Standard Setting”, in A. Jaffe, J. Lerner and S. Stern eds., Innovation Policy
and the Economy I, Cambridge: MIT Press.
[32] Shapiro, C. (2006), ”Injunctions, Hold-Up, and Patent Royalties,” U.C.
Berkeley Competition Policy Center Paper CPC06-062, available at
http://repositories.cdlib.org/iber/cpc/CPC06-062.
[33] Spence, A. M. (1975), ”Monopoly, Quality, and Regulation,” Bell Journal of
Economics, 6(2):417-429.
[34] Spence, A. M. (1976), ”Product Selection, Fixed Costs and Monopolistic Com-
petition,” Review of Economic Studies, 43:217-235.
[35] Tirole, J. (1988), The Theory of Industrial Organization, Cambridge: MIT Press.
[36] Vickers, John (1995), ”Competition and Regulation in Vertically Related Mar-
kets,” Review of Economic Studies 62:1–18.
[37] Walsh, J.P., A. Arora and W.M. Cohen (2003), ”Effects of Research Tool Patents
and Licensing on Biomedical Innovation,” in Patents in the Knowledge-Based
Economy, W. M. Cohen and S. A. Merrill eds., 285-340, Washington, D.C.:
National Academy Press.
39
[38] Wang, X. H. (1998), ”Fee versus royalty licensing in a Cournot duopoly,” Eco-
nomics Letters 60:55-62.
[39] Weitzman, M. (1974), ”Prices vs. Quantities,” Review of Economic Studies,
41(4):477-491.
[40] Ziedonis, R.M. (2003), ”Patent Litigation in the U.S. Semiconductor Industry,”
in Patents in the Knowledge-Based Economy, W. M. Cohen and S. A. Merrill
eds., 180-216, Washington, D.C.: National Academy Press.
40
Appendix
A Proof of Proposition 3
We first study the impact of a unit fee γ on the downstream equilibrium. Charging
a unit fee γ pushes the Hotelling price by the same amount:
pH (n; γ) ≡ γ + t
n
;
as a result, downstream profits (net here of payments to the IP owner) are not affected
by this fee:
piH (n; γ) ≡ piH (n) = t
n2
− f,
In contrast, when downstream firms act as local monopolists, they pass only part of
the fee γ on to consumers; their prices and profits are then equal to:
pm (γ) ≡ arg max
p
(p− γ)Dm (p) = r + γ
2
,
pim (γ) ≡ (r − γ)
2
2t
− f.
The unit fee also affects the conditions under which the various competition regimes
prevail. The Hotelling competitive regime now prevails when
pH (n; γ) +
t
2n
= γ +
3t
2n
< r,
that is,
n > n (γ) ≡ 3
2
t
r − γ , (6)
whereas the local monopoly regime prevails when
pm (γ) +
t
2n
=
r + γ
2
+
t
2n
≥ r,
or
n ≤ n (γ) ≡ t
r − γ . (7)
In the intermediate range [n (γ) , n (γ)], the entire market is served at a price as before
equal to pˆ (n) = r − t/2n, so that each downstream firm earns
pˆi (n; γ) ≡ 1
n
(
r − γ − t
2n
)
− f,
41
which decreases in n in that range;29 the downstream equilibrium is thus now such
that (note again that profits are expressed here net of access fees):
• for n < n (γ) ≡ t
r − γ :
p∗ (n; γ) = pm (γ) =
r − γ
2
and pi∗ (n; γ) = pim (γ) =
(r − γ)2
2t
− f.
• for n (γ) < n < n (γ) ≡ 3
2
t
r − γ :
p∗ (n; γ) = pˆ (n) = r − t
2n
and pi∗ (n; γ) = pˆi (n) =
1
n
(
r − γ − t
2n
)
− f,
• for n > n (γ):
p∗ (n; γ) = pH (n; γ) = γ +
t
n
and pi∗ (n; γ) = piH (n) =
t
n2
− f,
We now show that the IP owner can replicate the fully integrated monopoly
outcome by setting the maximal fee γ = γ¯ = r − √2tf . Indeed, charging γ = γ¯
leads to pm (γ) = pM = pˆ
(
nM
)
and pim (γ¯) = 0, which ensures that n = nM and
p = pM constitutes effectively a continuation equilibrium. Thus, setting the unit fee
to γ = γ¯ allows the IP holder to replicate the fully integrated industry outcome and
earn the monopoly profit ΠM .
B Proof of Propositions 6 and 7
Consider first the case of flat rate access fees. Given the two IP owners’ fees φ1 and
φ2, the number of downstream firms entering the market is given by n
∗ (φ1 + φ2),
where
n∗ (φ) ≡

(pi∗)−1 (φ) when φ < pim,
any n ≤ n when φ = pim,
0 when φ > pim.
Each Ui then obtains a profit equal to
Πi = n
∗ (φ1 + φ2)φi.
29
pˆi′ (n; γ) = − (r − γ)
n2
+
t
n3
=
r − γ
n3
(n (γ)− n) < 0
as long as n > n (γ).
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As already noted, independent licensing may trigger ”coordination breakdown” where
both IP owners charge fees higher than the monopoly profit pim and no downstream
firm enters the market, but these equilibria involve weakly dominated strategies. We
now focus on equilibria which do not rely on such strategies, in which both upstream
firms charge a fee lower than pim.
Fix the rival’s fee φj < pi
m and suppose first that Ui chooses to induce a number
ni of downstream firms that is higher than n, by setting a fee φi such that φi + φ
e =
pi∗ (ni) = piH (ni); Ui would then rather increase φi in order to reduce ni to n: indeed,
its profit is then given by
Πi = niφi = ni
(
piH (ni)− φe
)
= ΠH (ni)− niφe,
which decreases in ni (since the total Hotelling-type profit Π
H (n) decreases as n
increases). Therefore, the upstream firms will never choose to have more than n
downstream firms. Similarly, setting φi = pi
m − φj induces any n ≤ n firms to enter
and gives Ui a profit
Πi = ni (pi
m − φj) ,
which is positive and proportional to the number of firms; hence Ui will never choose
to induce less than n downstream firms.30
Thus, without loss of generality, we can assume that Ui sets a fee φi such that
φi + φj ∈ [pi, pim], where
pi = pi∗ (n) =
4r2
9t
− f,
so as to induce a number of firms ni ∈ [n, n], given by φi +φj = pi∗ (ni) = pˆi (ni), that
maximizes
Πi = niφi = ni (pˆi (ni)− φj) = Πˆ (ni)− niφj = r − t
2ni
− ni (f + φj) .
Ignoring the constraint ni ∈ [n, n] would lead Ui to choose
ni = n
M (f + φj) =
√
t
2 (f + φj)
, (8)
which is always larger than n and is smaller than n as long as
2r2
9t
− f ≡ φˆ ≤ φj ≤ r
2
2t
− f.
30Setting φi = pim − φj triggers any number ni ≤ n; however, Ui can indeed ”pick” n = n by
charging a fee slightly below pim − φj .
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Therefore, Ui’s best response to φj is to induce a number of firms ni = n
R (φj)
characterized by
nR (φ) ≡ nΠ (f + φ) =

n =
3
2
t
r
≤ nM (f + φj) when φ ≤ φˆ,
nM (f + φj) < n when φˆ ≤ r22t − f
n when φ > r
2
2t
− f
.
The corresponding fee is then φi = φ
R (φj), where
φR (φ) =

pi − φ when φ ≤ φˆ,
pˆi
(
nM (f + φ)
)− φ when r2
2t
− f ≥ φ > φˆ
pim − φ when φ ≥ r2
2t
− f,
where
pˆi
(
nM (f + φ)
)− φ = r√
t
2(f+φ)
− t
2 t
2(f+φ)
− (f + φ) = r
√
2 (f + φ)
t
− 2 (f + φ) . (9)
We now check that the best responses φi = φ
R (φj), for i 6= j = 1, 2, cross once in
the range φ > φˆ; the corresponding equilibrium then satisfies nR (φ1) = n
R (φ2) and
is thus symmetric: φ1 = φ2 = φ
D and n1 = n2 = n
D, characterized by:
nD = nM
(
f + φD
)
=
√
t
2 (f + φD)
and 2φD = pˆi
(
nD
)
=
1
nD
(
r − t
2nD
)
− f.
These two conditions imply:
2φn2 = t− 2fn2 = rn− t
2
− fn2,
and thus:
fn2 + rn− 3t
2
= 0, (10)
which has a unique non-negative solution:
nD ≡ r
2f
(√
1 + 6
tf
r2
− 1
)
.
It can be checked that nD ∈ (n, n) (that is, φˆ < φD < pim) and thus constitutes
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indeed an equilibrium number of downstream firms:
nD > n ⇐⇒ r
2f
(√
1 + 6
tf
r2
− 1
)
>
t
r
⇐⇒
√
1 + 6
tf
r2
> 1 + 2
tf
r2
⇐⇒ 1 + 6tf
r2
> 1 + 4
tf
r2
+ 4
(
tf
r2
)2
⇐⇒ 2tf
r2
(
1− 2tf
r2
)
> 0,
which boils down to r2 > 2tf and is thus satisfied whenever the industry is viable
(assumption 1); and similarly
nD < n ⇐⇒ r
2f
(√
1 + 6
tf
r2
− 1
)
<
3t
2r
⇐⇒
√
1 + 6
tf
r2
> 1 + 3
tf
r2
,
⇐⇒ 1 + 6tf
r2
< 1 + 6
tf
r2
+ 9
(
tf
r2
)2
,
which is always satisfied.
We now show that this equilibrium is unique in the range φ < pim. Note first
that, in this range, the best response function is uniquely defined and continuous. In
addition, for φ > φˆ the slope of this reaction function is given by (using (9)
dφR
dφ
(φ) =
r
t
√
2(f+φ)
t
− 2 = n
M (f + φ)
t/r
− 2,
where nM (f + φ) decreases from 3t
2r
to t
r
as φ increases from φˆ to pim; therefore,
the slope of the best response is first constant and equal to −1 for φ < φˆ and then
lies between −1/2 and −1 for φˆ < φ < pim. It follows that φ1 = φ2 = φD ∈
(
φˆ, pim
)
constitutes the only point where the two best responses intersect in the range φi < pi
m
(see Figure 1).
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Last, it is straightforward to confirm that double marginalization leads to fewer
licenses being issued. This is obvious in the case of coordination breakdown, where
no license is issued. But even if the upstream firms coordinate on the equilibrium
φ1 = φ2 = φ
D; indeed, φD > 0 implies
nD = nM
(
f + φD
)
< nM = nM (f) ,
which together with nD < n, leads to
nD < min
{
nM , n
}
= nΠ.
In addition, double marginalization can excessively reduce the number of licenses:
nD < nW ⇐⇒ r
2f
(√
1 + 6
tf
r2
− 1
)
<
√
t
4f
,
which boils down to
r2 >
25
4
tf.
We now turn to the case of percentage royalties. We have seen that each Ui seeks
to maximize
Πi = (1− τj)
[
Πˆ (n)− n τjf
1− τj
]
.
In the absence of any restriction on n, it would therefore seek to induce a number of
firms, ni, such that:
Πˆ′ (ni) =
τjf
1− τj .
In equilibrium, the number of firms is therefore either n (if the number just defined,
ni, exceeds n for both IP holders) or both firms charge the same rate τ1 = τ2 = τˆ
R
and induce a number of firms nˆR < n, which satisfy
Πˆ′
(
nˆR
)
=
τˆRf
1− τˆR . (11)
Since Πˆ (n) coincides with the industry profit and is quasi-concave, the number nˆR
is always strictly lower than piM , characterized by Πˆ (n) = 0, but may exceed n (this
may happen when nM largely exceeds n). The equilibrium number of firms therefore
satisfies
nR = min
{
nˆR, n
} ≤ nΠ = min{nM , n} ,
with a strict inequality when and only when nΠ = nM (that is, when nM ≤ n).
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When nˆR > n, then nR = n > nΠ. When instead nR ≤ n, then nR = nˆR .
Combining (11) with condition (4) for τ = τ1 + τ2 = 2τ
R, i.e.
pˆi
(
nR
)
=
2τRf
1− 2τR ,
then implies that nR satisfies
Πˆ′ (n) =
1− 2τR
2− 2R pˆi (n) . (12)
Similarly, in the case of fixed access fees each Ui maximizes
Πˆ (n)− nφj,
which leads to nD and φ1 = φ2 = φ
D, characterized by Πˆ′
(
nD
)
= φD.and pˆi
(
nD
)
=
2φD. Therefore, nD satisfies
Πˆ′ (n) =
pˆi (n)
2
. (13)
The left-hand side is the same in (12) and (13) and, in both conditions, both sides
decrease with n; moreover,
d
dn
[
Πˆ′ (n)− pˆi (n)
2
]
= Πˆ′′ (n)− pˆi (n)
2
= − t
n3
− 1
2
(
− r
n2
+
t
n3
)
= − 3t
2n3
+
r
2n2
=
r
2n2
(
1− 3t
rn
)
,
which, using (10), is negative for n = nD; the left-hand side thus crosses the right-
hand side ”from above” in (13):
1− 3t
rn
= 1− 3t
2rn
− 3t
2rn
= −fn
r
− 3t
2rn
< 0.
Finally, for any τR > 0, we have
1− 2τR
2− 2R <
1
2
,
implying that the right-hand side is smaller in (12) than (13); together with the above
observations, this implies nD < nR.
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C Cross licensing
We analyze here the situation where the upstream firms allow each other to license
their own technology. We will denote by ψi the (upstream) fee that Ui charges to
Uj for each license it issues, and by Φj the (downstream) fee charged by Uj for a
”complete” license covering both technologies. The timing is as follows:
• first, the IP owners set the upstream fees ψ1 and ψ2 (more on this below);
• second, the IP owners set their downstream fees Φ1 and Φ2; the downstream
firms then decide whether to buy a license and enter the market.
We will first characterize the continuation equilibria of the second stage, for given
upstream fees ψ1 and ψ2. We will then consider two scenarios for the first stage: in
the first scenario, the IP owners jointly agree on a reciprocal fee ψ1 = ψ2 = ψ; in the
second scenario, the two IP owners sets their fees simultaneously and independently.
C.1 Downstream IP competition
We take here the upstream fees ψ1 and ψ2 and consider the second stage, where
the two IP owners charge fees Φ1 and Φ2 for ”complete” licenses; any downstream
entrant then buys a license from the cheapest licensor and, given Φ = min {Φ1,Φ2},
the number of entrants is equal to n∗ (Φ).
Note first that each Ui is unwilling to sell a complete license for a fee Φi lower than
Uj’s upstream fee ψj. Therefore, if min {ψ1, ψ2} > pim, then no license is issued and
both IP owners get zero profit. If min {ψ1, ψ2} = pim, there are multiple continuation
equilibria, in which the upstream firms set downstream fees exceeding pim or serve
up to n licences at a fee Φ = pim, thereby sharing up to npim. If ψi ≥ pim > ψj then,
anticipating that Uj is unwilling to issue any license, Ui will set Φi so as to maximize
n∗ (Φi) (Φi − ψj) ,
which using φi ≡ Φi − ψj as the decision variable, amounts to maximize
n∗ (φi + ψj)φi
and thus leads Ui to choose
φi = φ
R (ψj)
or, equivalently:Φi = Φ
R (ψj), where
ΦR (φ) ≡ φR (φ)− φ,
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which results in a number of downstream firms equal to nR (ψj). The two firms then
obtain
Πi = n
R (ψj)
(
ΦR (ψj)− ψj
)
= nR (ψj)φ
R (ψj) ,
Πj = n
R (ψj)ψj.
It is straightforward to check that Uj has indeed no incentive to undercut Ui, since
this would require selling at a loss.
We now consider the case where both IP owners set fees lower than pim.
Consider first a candidate equilibrium where Φ1 = Φ2 = Φ. Each Ui can then
obtain n (Φ)ψi by increasing its fee (and letting the other IP owner sell its license to all
downstream entrants) and can also obtain n (Φ) (Φ− ψj) by slightly undercutting its
rival. Therefore, it must be the case that Φ = ψ1 +ψ2. Conversely, Φ1 = Φ2 = ψ1 +ψ2
constitutes an equilibrium as long as no Ui benefits from undercutting its rival; this
is the case when
Φi < ψ1 + ψ2 =⇒ n∗ (Φi) (Φi − ψj) < n∗ (ψ1 + ψ2)ψi,
that is, using φi ≡ Φi − ψj, when
φi < ψi =⇒ n∗ (φi + ψj)φi < n∗ (ψ1 + ψ2)ψi. (14)
Since the profit function n (ψ1 + ψ2)ψi = n (Φi) (Φi − ψj) is strictly quasi-concave in
Φi,
31 (14) is equivalent to:
ψi ≤ φR (ψj) .
Consider now a candidate equilibrium in which Φi < Φj, implying that the two IP
owners obtain respectively:(posing φi = Φi − ψj)
Πi = n
∗ (Φi) (Φi − ψj) = n∗ (φi + ψj)φi,
Πj = n
∗ (Φi)ψj = n∗ (φi + ψj)ψj.
Ui should then not be able to gain from small deviations, which implies φi = φ
R (ψj)
(and thus Φi = Φ
R (ψj), n = n
R (ψj)) and should not gain either from letting Uj sell
at Φj, that is, Φj should be ”large enough” (namely, such that Πi = n
R (ψj)φ
R (ψj) ≥
n∗ (Φj)ψi – Φj > pim, implying n∗ (Φj) = 0, would do). In addition, Uj should not
gain from undercutting Ui, that is:
Πj = n
R (ψj)ψj ≥ max
Φ≤ΦR(ψj)
n∗ (Φ) (Φ− ψi) . (15)
31It coincides with the industry profit, which is strictly concave, for Φ ∈ [pi, pim], drops to zero
for Φ > pim (and lies anywhere between 0 and npim for Φ = pim), and is equal to ΠH (n∗ (Φ)) for
Φ < pi, in which case it strictly increases with Φ.
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In particular, this implies (considering a deviation to just below Φi = Φ
R (ψj))
Πj = n
R (ψj)ψj ≥ nR (ψj)
(
ΦR (ψj)− ψi
)
,
that is:
ψj ≥ ΦR (ψj)− ψi
or
ψi ≥ ΦR (ψj)− ψj = φR (ψj) .
Building on these insights, we have for ψ1, ψ2 < pi
m:
• If ψi ≤ φR (ψj) for i 6= j = 1, 2, there is a unique continuation equilibrium,
which is such that Φ1 = Φ2 = ψ1 + ψ2. In this equilibrium, each Ui obtains
Πi = n
∗ (ψ1 + ψ2)ψi.
• If ψi > φR (ψj) but ψj ≤ φR (ψi), there is a unique continuation equilibrium,
such that Uj charges a prohibitively high fee while Ui sells n
R (ψj) complete
licenses at a fee ΦR (ψj); in this equilibrium the two IP owners obtain respec-
tively
Ui = n
R (ψj)φ
R (ψj) ,
Uj = n
R (ψj)ψj.
Note that condition (15) is indeed satisfied, as ψi > φ
R (ψj) and ψj ≤ φR (ψi)
imply ψi > ψj (see Figure 1) and thus Φ
R (ψi) ≥ ΦR (ψj) ;32 therefore:
max
Φ≤ΦR(ψj)
n (Φ) (Φ− ψi) = nR (ψj)
(
ΦR (ψj)− ψi
)
> nR (ψj)ψj,
where the last inequality follows from ψi > φ
R (ψj) = Φ
R (ψj)− ψj
• Finally, consider the case where ψi > φR (ψj) for i 6= j = 1, 2 and, without
loss of generality, suppose that ψi ≥ ψj. A similar reasoning then shows that
there always exists an equilibrium in which Uj charges a prohibitively high fee
while Ui sells n
R (ψj) complete licenses at a fee Φ
R (ψj). In addition, there may
exist an equilibrium in which Ui charges a prohibitively high fee while Uj sells
nR (ψi) complete licenses at a fee Φ
R (ψi); for this to be an equilibrium, it must
however be the case that
Πi = n
R (ψi)ψi ≥ max
Φ≤ΦR(ψi)
n∗ (Φ) (Φ− ψj) .
32ΦR (φ) = pi∗
(
min
{
n, nM (f + φ)
})
, where pi∗ (n) decreases with n and nM (f + φ) decreases
with φ; therefore, ΦR (φ) wealky increases with φ.
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C.2 Upstream interaction
We now turn to the first stage and consider first the scenario where the two IP owners
jointly determine a reciprocal upstream fee ψ1 = ψ2 = ψ. By setting
ψ =
pi∗
(
nΠ
)
2
,
they can ensure that the second stage leads to Φ1 = Φ2 = pi
∗ (nΠ) and thus to
the entry of nΠ downstream firms, and share equally the profit that an integrated
IP owner could generate. To see this, given the above analysis of the second stage
it suffices to show that pi∗
(
nΠ
)
/2 is no higher than φD; but this derives directly
from the fact that, due to double marginalization, a total fee of 2φD for the two
technologies generates less entry than is desirable for an integrated monopolist IP
(that is, nD < nΠ, and so 2φD = pi∗
(
nD
)
> pi∗
(
nΠ
)
).
Finally, consider the alternative scenario where the two IP owners set their up-
stream fees simultaneously and independently. It is easy to check that, in the range
ψ1, ψ2 ≤ pim:
• There is no equilibrium in which ψi < φR (ψj) for i 6= j = 1, 2: each Ui would
obtain a profit Πi = n
∗ (ψ1 + ψ2)ψi and would thus deviate and increase its fee.
• There is no equilibrium in which ψi ≥ φR (ψj) but ψj < φR (ψi): Uj would
then obtain a profit Πj = n
R (ψj)ψj, which increases with ψj, and would thus
deviate and increase its fee.
• There is no equilibrium in which ψi > φR (ψj) for i 6= j = 1, 2, ψj > φD and Ui
sells some licenses; this would require Φi < Φj and Πi = n
R (ψj)φ
R (ψj), but
then Ui would profitably deviate by setting a fee ψ
′
i just below φ
R (ψj), which
would prompt Uj to sell n
R (ψ′i) > n
R (ψj) (ψj > φ
D implies φR (ψj) < φ
D < ψj)
and give Ui a greater profit Π
′
i = n
R (ψ′i)ψ
′
i = n
R (ψ′i)φ
R (ψj).
• There exist equilibria in which ψi > φR (ψj) for i 6= j = 1, 2, ψj ≤ φD (which
together imply ψi > φ
D ≥ ψj) and Uj sells complete licenses; in each such
equilibrium the two IP owners obtain respectively
Πi = n
R (ψj)φ
R (ψj) ,Πj = n
R (ψj)ψj.
In principle, Uj would want to deviate and increase its fee ψj, but such devi-
ations can be deterred by ”reverting” to a continuation equilibrium where Uj,
rather than Ui sells the licenses for a fee Φj = Φ
R (ψi), since in that case Uj
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obtains Π′j = n
R (ψi)φ
R (ψi), which is lower than Πj since φ
R (ψi) < ψj and
ψi > ψj moreover implies n
R (ψi) < n
R (ψj). This however requires that such
continuation equilibrium exists, which in turn requires (see condition (15)):
nR (ψi)ψi ≥ max
Φ≤ΦR(ψi)
n∗ (Φ) (Φ− ψj) .
The right-hand side decreases with ψj whereas the left-hand side increases with
ψi, and they coincide for ψi = ψj = φ
D. Therefore this condition determines a
curve that goes through
(
φD, φD
)
in the (ψ1, ψ2) plane and above which the two
continuation equilibria coexist. The equilibrium that generates the greater joint
profit is the one for which ψj is the lowest, and thus for which ψi is maximal:
ψi = pi
m and ψj such that n
R (ψj)φ
R (ψj) = npi
m. This equilibrium gives both
IP owners a larger total profit than the ”double marginalization” outcome but
only one IP owner benefits from it: ψj < φ
D and φR
(
φD
)
= φD indeed imply
Πi = n
R (ψj)φ
R (ψj) > Π
D = nR
(
φD
)
φR
(
φD
)
,
Πj = n
R (ψj)ψj < Π
D = nR
(
φD
)
φD.
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